Oil, War and the Euro, Submitted to Axis of Logic by author, December 23, 2003

By Allan Rubin
Dec 23, 2003, 14:01

In attempting to make sense of the Bush administration's drive to war in Iraq, we have heard much from the White House of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  When that rationale proved to be an illusion, the administration turned to 'liberating' Iraq from Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. What has become clear is that the administration's primary goal is liberation'liberating Iraq from its oil reserves. This immediate goal satisfied three of the administration's longer term goals: establishing permanent bases in the region (in order to facilitate US dominance of this oil-producing region, especially after having pulled out of all our bases in Saudi Arabia); ensuring control over the world's second largest oil reserves'to ensure oil supplies for the US and dominance over potential rivals such as the European Union (EU), Russia or China; and protecting the value of the dollar from threats that Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other oil-producing countries will price their oil in euros (the EU currency). And certainly, there are financial benefits to administration-connected oil-producing, oil services and construction companies. 

The oil depletion problem

Depletion of the world's oil reserves will cause worldwide oil production to peak within the next six to eight years. That is the time when oil production will fail to meet worldwide demand.  Starting at that time, we can expect oil production to decline by around 2 percent per year, using today's demand figures.  In the face of increasing demand (also around 2 percent per year) for an increasingly scarce resource, the shortfall will be increasing by around 4 percent a year (unless high oil prices and a failing world economy reduce demand). An oil crisis will occur not when the world runs out of oil, but when worldwide oil production fails to keep up with demand. [1]  

The long-term consequences of oil depletion will be enormous. There is no good substitute for oil. Neither coal, solar cells nor uranium can run cars or airplanes. Our electric grid, transportation and industrial processes are all dependent on cheap fossil fuels. Less obvious is that our food and water supplies are as well.  Modern industrial agriculture is extremely energy-intensive.  Energy is needed for running farm machinery, producing fertilizers and pesticides, pumping water for irrigation and transporting farm production vast distances to the places where it is consumed.  All of these uses are now threatened.  The administration is aware of the oil depletion issue and has been concerned with gaining control of the world's remaining oil supplies. Clearly, if the US controls much of the world's remaining oil supply, it will have a stranglehold on industrial societies that require it.

A temporary solution to the oil depletion problem might have been to accelerate production from the Caspian Sea area and the Persian Gulf'especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the countries with the largest proven oil reserves. The problems with this were an uncertain political climate in Saudi Arabia (an ailing king and much internal pressure for a less repressive society), uncertain production from Iraq (due to years of sanctions and neglect) and dwindling expectations for the Caspian Sea reserves.  The original estimates placed the Caspian Sea reserves at 50 to 200 billion barrels, almost as large as Saudi Arabia's estimated 250 billion barrel reserves.  But when drilling was started in the Caspian Sea region it was found that many of the wells were dry and the remaining wells produced oil of a very poor quality.

 

US dollar dominates the world economy

 

The Bush administration's desire to strengthen the dollar by controlling the pricing of oil is perhaps less straightforward, but potentially at least as important.It is clear that the US dominates the world, both militarily and economically. The US dollar dominates the world's economic transactions. Eighty percent of the world's foreign exchange transactions and half of the world's exports are denominated in US dollars. Two-thirds of the world's official exchange reserves'dollars held by countries' central banks to back their own currencies'are in US dollars.

What is less clear is how precarious the US economic position is. The US government's economic policies have been disastrous.  The US is suffering from huge federal budget deficits worsened by unaffordable tax cuts, massive unemployment, widespread corporate accounting abuses, near zero personal savings, record personal debt and declining corporate profits.  In large part because the US has pushed the corporations' so-called free-trade agenda, the US has been cannibalizing much of its industrial base (and its service jobs as well) and exporting those jobs to low-wage countries. Estimates of jobs lost to overseas countries since the start of the recession in March 2001 range from 500,000 to 1,000,000 , with professionals representing around 15 percent of the total.[2]One result is a large outflow of US dollars to foreign countries to pay for goods and services that used to be available from American manufacturers. Consequently, the US balance of payments ('current accounts') deficit is running $554 billion per year and rising.  This is quadruple what it was ten years ago and is above 5 percent of the US gross national product for the first time in history.[3]

In light of these economic realities, any further threats to the dollar could be disastrous. The major support for the value of the dollar is demand from around the world. Countries must have dollars to buy oil, to participate in world trade and to back their own currencies.   This demand for dollars'over and above US purchases of goods and services'is what allows the US to run its large deficits with impunity.  Much of this demand comes from the fact that most of the world's oil transactions are priced in dollars'that has been the case since 1973. Oil-importing countries must have dollars if they are to buy oil. If OPEC were to switch its oil exports to euros, oil-importing countries would have to convert dollars held by their central banks to euros.  This would reduce the worldwide demand for dollars, causing the dollar to drop in value; the likely result would be foreign investors abandoning the US stock market (and other dollar-denominated assets such as real estate). As the dollar falls in value, countries' central banks will start to move their reserves into other currencies.  Some of this scenario has already started to occur, as evidenced by the recent rise in the euro versus the dollar, up 28 percent in the last 18 months.[4]This series of events will have very serious consequences for the US economy in its present state.

The euro was set up by the European Union as an alternative to the dollar. Other countries are beginning to see the euro as an attractive alternative as well. They would like to switch to the euro both for their own economic well-being and out of fear of the power of the US empire and its unilateral, militaristic policies. As nations switch to the euro for oil sales or currency reserves, it will become increasingly difficult for the US to maintain its huge budget and trade deficits, and the dollar will drop in value. Iraq started pricing its oil in euros in November 2000, an unforgivable offense in the eyes of the Bush administration.   Iraq also converted $10 billion of its currency reserves to euros. These were really their 'weapons of mass destruction''from which they profited greatly because of the rise in the value of the euro.  Iran has been talking publicly about pricing its oil in euros.  In 2002, Iran converted most of its reserve currency to euros. In  October 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia might price its oil in euros as well.[5] Venezuela, another OPEC member, has also indicated that it may switch to euros. North Korea has also decided to ask for payment in euros for its exports.

 

Summary

The Bush administration saw as critical the need to secure the world's major oil fields at a time of impending world shortages. The expected oil from the Caspian Sea region never really materialized. The threat to the US economy from a trend to price oil in euros is very real. The moribund US economy would not stand it without serious consequences'think 1929. In addition, the EU would like to see the euro become the world's reserve currency, a real challenge to US hegemony. US takeover of Iraq secured the world's second largest oil reserves, allowed the US to take control of Iraq's oil industry and eventually price Iraq's oil in dollars instead of euros, secured for the US a vote in OPEC and introduced the real possibility of either destroying OPEC or at least increasing Iraqi oil production beyond OPEC quotas, thereby reducing oil prices in the short term and reducing the threat to the dollar and the US economy.

Notes

[1] Jeff Gerth, 'Report Sees Vast Needs for Energy Capital,' New York Times, Nov. 5, 2003; Charles Arthur, 'Oil and Gas Running Out Much Faster Than Expected, Says Study,' Independent (UK), Oct. 2, 2003.

[2]'A Statistic That's Missing: Jobs That Moved Overseas,' New York Times, Oct. 5, 2003.

[3] 'Foreigners May Not Have Liked the War, but They Financed It,' New York Times, Sept. 12, 2003.

[4] 'Currencies,' New York Times, Nov. 19, 2003.

[5] 'Putin: Why Not Price Oil in Euros,'  Defensetalk.com, October 10, 2003, 

http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/printer_142.shtml. 

Peak oil resources

The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, http://www.peakoil.net/.

Campbell, Colin J. 'Peak Oil.' Presentation at the Technical University of Clausthal, December 2000. http://www.geologie.tu-clausthal.de/Campbell/lecture.html.

Campbell, Colin J. 'Peak Oil: An Outlook on Crude Oil Depletion.'

http://greatchange.org/ov-campbell,outlook.html.

Campbell, Colin J. 'Peak Oil: A Turning Point for Humankind.'Culture Change, Issue 19, www.culturechange.org/issue19/peakoil.htm.

Campbell, Colin J., and Jean H. Laherrère, 'The End Of Cheap Oil,' Scientific American March 1998, http://dieoff.org/page140.htm. 

The Coming Global Oil Crisis,http://www.oilcrisis.com/. 

Die Off, http://www.dieoff.org/. 

Heinberg, Richard. The Party's Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies. New Society Publishers, 2003.

Monbiot, George, "Bottom of the barrel The world is running out of oil - so why do politicians refuse to talk about it?", The Guardian (UK), December 2, 2003, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/columnist/story/0,9321,1097674,00.html

 'Oil as a Finite Resource: When Is Global Production Likely to Peak?'  World Resources Institute, March 1996, updated March 2000. http://www.wri.org/climate/jm_oil_000.html.

Oil and the economy resources

Clark, W.  'The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq:  A Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Analysis of the Unspoken Truth.' http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html. 

Fingleton, Eamonn. 'American Trade: Hurtling towards the Tipping Point.'Unsustainable.org, Nov. 18, 2003. http://www.unsustainable.org/view_art_un.asp?AID=291.

Heard, Geoffrey. 'The War on Iraq: US and Europe Clash for World Economic Dominance.' The Age (Melbourne, Australia), March 20, 2003. http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/HEA306B.html.

Henderson, Hazel. 'Iraq, the Dollar and the Euro.' Globalist, June 2, 2003. http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/printStoryId.aspx?StoryId=3193.

Islam, Faisal. 'When Will We Buy Oil in Euros?' Observer (UK), Feb. 23, 2003. http://www.pressurepoint.org/pp_iraq_when_will_we_buy_euros.html.

Nunan, Cóilín. 'Oil, Currency and the War on Iraq.' http://www.feasta.org/documents/papers/oil1.htm.

Research Unit for Political Economy, Mumbai, India. 'Behind the Invasion of Iraq.' 2003.

http://www.rupe-india.org/34/contents.html.

Peter Dale Scott,'Bush's deep reasons for war on iraq: oil, petrodollars, and the opec euro Question.'

http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/iraq.html.

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/home.htm.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.doc.gov/.

© Allan Rubin, 2003

Bush Administration: Statements on Missile Defense

The Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project tracks statements by the President and key officials on missile defense. Know of a statement that is not on this page? E-mail the Project.

Statements by month:

29 January 2002

President Bush's State of the Union address

"States like these (Iran, Iraq and North Korea), and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security."

13 December 2001

President Bush on abandoning the ABM Treaty

"Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. And neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.

. . . We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses."

10 December 2001

President George W. Bush at the Citadel

"We must protect America and our friends against all forms of terrorism including the terrorism that could arrive on a missile."

Secretary of State Colin Powell with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov following their meeting in Moscow

"The United States has held the position for some years that we want to pursue the development of a limited missile defense system, a missile defense system that would be directed against irresponsible states that are developing missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction. We are not developing a system that would in any way undermines the deterrence capability of [Russian] offensive nuclear forces. The problem is that as we move forward with the development of such a system, the ABM Treaty constrains our testing and development and our deployment of such systems. So in due course, as we have said for a long period of time, we have to find a way to get out of the constraints of the ABM Treaty."

6 November 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a news briefing

"With respect to Russia, President Putin, while of a different view, clearly understands President Bush's need and intention to move beyond the ABM Treaty. There are a number of ways it might occur, and we're still exploring how it may unfold. I described for them in some specificity the ways in which the ABM Treaty has already begun to inhibit our program of research, development and testing. And our need to get beyond it: we delivered -- and they heard -- that message.

We also discussed reductions in offensive nuclear forces as well as the need for transparency and predictability in -- with respect to our offensive and defensive nuclear programs.

Of course, the relationship is multi-dimensional. It's political and economic as well as security. I discussed the campaign against terrorism and the urgency that the availability of weapons of mass destruction brings to this very serious problem."

1 November 2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in a press briefing

"The President has been very consistent, going all the way back to the time that he was elected, that he had certain principles that he believes should guide us as we've thought about the new environment in which we find ourselves with Russia, at the end of the Cold War.

Those principles have not changed. First of all, he's said that he believes very strongly that the United States ought to do a strategic nuclear review, a review of its offensive forces, and bring those forces to a level consistent with our own deterrence needs, not as a matter of negotiation, but as a matter of restructuring our nuclear forces.

Secondly, the President has made clear that he believes that we're going to have to move beyond the ABM Treaty for two reasons: first of all because it constrains our ability to fully explore the possibilities for missile defense, and secondly because he believes that it is not representative of the kind of relationship that we have with the Russians."

25 October 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing

"As you know, we've redesigned the U.S. ballistic missile defense research, development and testing program so that -- to be unconstrained by the ABM Treaty, a treaty that, of course, was left over from the Cold War, and after September 11th, is even less relevant today. We have said we will not violate the treaty while it remains in force. In recent days, to keep from having it suggested that we might not be keeping that commitment, we have voluntarily restrained our ballistic missile defense test program. Specifically, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has refrained from conducting several test activities, each of which some lawyers could debate might have been a violation of the treaty, were we to have proceeded. As we all know, treaties and most legal documents have vagueness to them. We've said we won't violate it; therefore, we do not want to be in a position of having a small minority of people suggesting that we in fact are violating it. So we have, ... decided not to go forward....

...For some time now, we've advised the Congress and the government of the Russian Federation that the planned missile defense testing program that we have was going to bump up against the ABM Treaty. That has now happened. This fact, this reality, it seems to me, provides an impetus for the discussions that President Bush has been having with President Putin, and which will continue here in Washington early next month."

21 October 2001

President Bush and Russian President Putin's meeting in China

• "Both our nations are working to prevent proliferation and to reduce the threat from Cold War weapon stockpiles throughout the former Soviet Union.

  We also see progress in our efforts to build a new strategic framework. Today we discussed significantly lowering offensive nuclear weapon arsenals, within a framework that includes limited defenses, defenses that are able to protect both our lands from political blackmail, from potential terrorist attack. Both our nations must be able to defend ourselves against the new threats of the 21st century, including long-range ballistic missiles.

  The events of September the 11th make it clearer than ever that a Cold War ABM treaty that prevents us from defending our people is outdated, and I believe dangerous. Economic cooperation and progress will be an important part of our new relationship."
  

11 October 2001

President Bush's Prime Time News Conference

• "And I'm going to ask my friend (Russian President Putin) to envision a world in which a terrorist thug and/or a host nation might have the ability to develop -- to deliver a weapon of mass destruction via a -- via rocket. And wouldn't it be in our nation's advantage to be able to shoot it down? At the very least, it should be in our nation's advantage to determine whether we can shoot it down. And we're restricted from doing that because of an ABM Treaty that was signed during a totally different era."
  

30 September 2001

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with NBC "Meet the Press" with host Tim Russert

• "The terrorists, who are spreading terrorism across the globe, don't have armies, navies, or air forces, so they can't contest our armies. Instead, they look for seams, if you will. They look for ways that we are vulnerable, and, of course, as a free people, we are vulnerable. We're vulnerable to attack on our homeland, because we don't live in a fortress. We don't spend all of our time in fear of these things, and the examples of an asymmetrical attack would be a ballistic missile, and that's why so many nations are trying to get them -- the cruise missile, terrorist attack -- increasingly cyber attacks, because we're so technology dependent."

9 September 2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, NBC's Meet the Press

• "The fact is, that we are currently in a phase of testing and evaluation of the technologies that are available, largely because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been in force, largely because the Clinton administration chose to have a testing program that was constrained by the ABM Treaty. We really don't know the full potential of the technologies that are available. Now, we've said very clearly to the Russians and to all others, we've not yet chosen an architecture. We are in a research, development, testing and evaluation phase. We're going to be transparent about what we're trying to do. We're not ready to deploy. What we're ready to do is to get serious about the business of dealing with this emergent threat. Ballistic missiles are ubiquitous now. It's accidental launch, but it is also the fact that this technology rests in the hands of all kinds of irresponsible states. It would not be wise of the president of the United States or responsible of the president of the United States not to respond to that threat."

5 September 2001

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfled, MSNBC Interview

Q: How much trouble, in plain English, is the missile defense plan going to cause the United States around the world?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I think -- very modest -- any time anyone changes anything, there's going to be some question and some turmoil, but the reality is that many of our European allies have gone from either opposition or undecided coming over to support now and so true around the world. I think that we're going to find growing support for it as people better understand the nature of the threat, I think that -- that the need for missile defense will become much clearer.

23 August 2001

President George W. Bush, Remarks to Elementary School Students Followed by Media Q & A, Crawford, Texas

• "We will withdraw from the ABM Treaty on our timetable, at a time convenient to America."

22 August 2001

Deputy State Department Spokesman Philip Reeker, State Department daily briefing

• "We have set no deadline for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty."
• "We wish to find ways to jointly, with the Russians, move beyond the ABM Treaty, which we believe is a relic of a bygone age. We are simultaneously moving ahead with our missile defense program, which will of course bump up against the ABM Treaty, in some months, not years, as we have said."

21 August 2001

Under Secretary of State for arms control and international security affairs John Bolton, Echo of Moscow Radio Interview

• "The two presidents [Bush and Putin] actually meet first in Shanghai in October and then in Crawford, Texas ... in November. And I think that the two presidents would be disappointed in us if we didn't have something for them to consider ... in Texas.... Consider it an artificial deadline, and we're going to try and make as much progress as we can and we'll see what happens."
• "We've made it very clear that we're not going to violate the ABM Treaty, nor do we want to be subjected to criticism or second-guessing about what activities we're undertaking in development and testing of possible ballistic missile systems are or are not in violation of the treaty.... We want to find a way to work mutually with the government of Russia, either to find a way to mutually withdraw from the treaty or in some way together move beyond the constraints that the ABM Treaty places on our development effort. If, contrary to what our preference is, we're not able to reach agreement with Russia, then at some point in the not too distant future we would exercise our express right under the treaty to give notice of withdrawal. But withdrawal, of course, is not violating the treaty."

16 August 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, PBS Newshour Interview

• "You negotiate a treaty to try to control hostility between two parties. So if you can still consider the United States and Russia to be enemies, then obviously it would be natural to go into negotiations and establish ways that you can prevent each other from hurting each other. If you don't consider each other enemies -- We don't have negotiations like that for treaties to not be hostile with Mexico or Canada or France or England or any number of countries in the world. Russia is still, I think, captured to a certain extent by the old Cold War mentality and fear and apprehension and concern about the West."

14 August 2001

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Washington File Interview

• "...in those cases where... arms control treaties are ineffective or counterproductive or obsolete, they shouldn't be allowed to stand in the way of the development of our foreign policy."

6 August 2001

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Los Angeles Radio Interview

• "[Missile defense] is not cheap, but the defense of our country isn't cheap, but it's proven to be a terrifically valuable investment. We live in a world today that's more peaceful than in 100 years, and I would say a major reason for that is because American military strength, our defense capability, has helped to shore up the peaceful democracies of the world and helped to bring about an end to the Cold War, and that's a structure we want to preserve."

2 August 2001

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Chicago Radio Interview

• "I need to be clear, that at the moment we don't think, apart from the major powers, that is to say Russia, China, Britain and France, that any country has missiles with a range that can reach the United States. But the North Koreans are very close to being able to have that capability. The Pakistanis and Iranians have intermediate range missiles. For example, the Iranians can now hit Israeli cities with no trouble whatsoever. We don't think of Pakistan as hostile, but Pakistan is spreading technology to other countries. But the rate at which these developments take place, the number of countries among that list -- Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria -- is going to grow over the next five or ten years and it's going to take us that long to develop a defense against it. So we have to plan against the future. We can't just base it on whether the threat is here today or not. The solution isn't here today yet either."

1 August 2001

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, New York Times Interview

• "The thing is, we have some defenses against truck bombs, and we don't have a treaty that prohibits us from defending against truck bombs. But when you look at what the bad guys are doing, they're pouring enormous amounts of money into ballistic missiles. If truck bombs are such a marvelous alternative you wouldn't see that kind of investment, and I really think, to me, these are surmises, but I think you see that investment because it's one of the few areas of warfare where they have some ability to compete with us. It's only partly because we don't have the defenses. But certainly having no defense is a major contribution."
  

31 July 2001

Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, Department of Defense Briefing, Defense Department Report on Missile Testing

• "...we have said that we would not find ourselves in violation of the treaty. So you have courses of action to consider -- changing the test schedule, changing the activities, moving them to the right, finding that the question that you raised as to whether or not such and such an activity was in violation, ultimately finding the answer is no, we do not feel that the action is violation, and then pressing ahead. So there's a variety of options."
  

29 July 2001

National Security Adviser Condolezza Rice, CBS "Face the Nation"

• "Ultimately, if China is transferring weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to countries that are not responsible, or to countries that are security risks, I think that we're not going to have the kind of U.S.-China relationship that everybody would like to have."
• "This is going to be an engaged, internationalist administration, but it will not be an administration that signs on to treaties that are not in America's interest."
• "Anyone who does not wish to blackmail the United States should not see missile defense as a threat to them. And we believe that the Chinese do not want to blackmail us; therefore, they should not see this as a threat."

24 July 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington Times Interview

• "I keep hearing that what we do on missile defense could have an affect on the rate or pace or nature of what they [China] might do with respect to their ballistic missiles. It seems to me that that is misguided, that they're going to do what they're going to do and it matters little what we do, I think, with respect to missile defense."

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
"Bolton Says U.S. Seeks New Strategic Framework with Russia"

• "We need to escape from the inertia that has kept the concept of mutual assured destruction as the centerpiece of our strategic relationship with Russia. This focus is counterproductive and incompatible with the idea of developing a more cooperative, constructive relationship."
• "We are talking about supplementing retaliatory deterrence against small threats with effective defenses; and we are talking about accelerating the transformation of our security relationship with Russia into one in which Cold War calculations of retaliatory deterrence are increasingly irrelevant to the reality of cooperation and partnership."

23 July 2001

National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, press conference in Rome

• "We don't think that missile defense is to advantage the United States over Russia.... this is not aimed somehow at undermining the Russian strategic deterrent..... The President again reiterated to President Putin his view that this is a limited defense against certain kinds of threats. And I think that President Putin is beginning to understand that. He, himself, has even said that there are new threats out there that need to be examined in light of the new conditions."
• "We do not want to be accused of violating [the ABM] treaty. And this treaty is a very restrictive treaty. It was intended to prevent the development of ballistic missile defenses. It was intended to prevent, for instance, the ability to test mobility, to test sea-based systems in an ABM mode. So it is very restrictive. And there will come a time, and we don't know precisely when that is, but there will certainly come a time when a robust testing and evaluation program will come up against the limitations of the treaty. "
• "I would just draw your attention to the language which just about anything that you test in an ABM mode that is not ground-based is, in fact, in violation of the treaty.... The President has, I think, made very clear that the urgency to do something about the lack of a viable set of technologies that we can pursue, in order to deal with the new threats, is a matter of some urgency for his administration.... Presidents only have a limited amount of time to leave a legacy to their successors. And he feels very strongly that we've lost a lot of time because the testing and evaluation program has tried so hard to remain treaty-compliant that it really hasn't explored the full range of options. That's the urgency."

National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, "The Bilateral Meeting of President Bush with Russian President Putin," press briefing en route to Genoa

• "...A new way of security,... is lower levels of offensive forces on lower stages of alert, so that there's less danger of accident, or unauthorized release, missile defenses aimed at specific limited threats, and that we get out of a force structure that really came out of a time when we worried about a Soviet march across Europe that would lead then to nuclear war. So it's in that sense that they're linked, not that the defensive systems require a certain number of offensive systems. "
• "A robust testing and evaluation program is going to run afoul of this treaty. There's just no doubt about that. "

20 July 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Interview with Fox News

• "I think the important thing on national missile defense is to recognize that it takes about 1 1/2% of the defense budget. It's not like it's a dominant part. All missile defense, including theater missile defense, only takes about 2 1/2% of the defense budget. We had 28 Americans killed in Dhahran ten years ago and 99 wounded by a ballistic missile. These things are very dangerous. And the weapons that they put atop ballistic missiles today are increasingly powerful and weapons of mass destruction. So I think it would be very shortsighted for anyone to suggest that we need not worry about ballistic missiles. The number of countries that have these weapons is increasing every year. The number of total ballistic missiles on the face of the earth is growing every year. Their ranges are increasing, and the weapons that they mount on the ends of these missiles are increasingly powerful."

19 July 2001

Secretary of State Colin Powell remarks en route to Rome

• "(Finding a solution with Russia) is part of a much broader relationship with the United States that has trade elements to it, economic elements to it, the pursuit of common values with respect to human rights and individual freedoms, with respect to working together to resolve regional problems, and to review the entire strategic framework between the two nations."
  

17 July 2001

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D.Wolfowitz, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Ballistic Missile Defense

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): But that's not where you're coming from. You believe the North Korean threat is basically here and now, is that not correct?

Wolfowitz: I think it is moving along rapidly, yes, Senator.

Levin: All right. And you do want the tests to succeed, is that not correct?

Wolfowitz: That's correct.

Levin: Given those two facts, what you believe and what you hope, is it not a fair statement to say that you want the Fort Greeley activity to have a operational capability, albeit rudimentary, as soon as possible? Is that not a fair statement?

Wolfowitz: I think that's a fair statement. I just get -- I'm not a lawyer. I don't know what intent means, but I would like --

Levin: Your intent!

Wolfowitz: I would like that development to give us an option for a rudimentary operational capability, yes.

Levin: And to give it to us as quickly as possible.

Wolfowitz: Yes, Senator.

Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, following up your exchange with the chairman, as I understood it, the concept of Alaska becoming operational is when -- the mental intent that it become operational, replacing the testing crew with operational personnel. Was that what was your answer to the chairman's question?

Wolfowitz: I'd have to refer back to General Kadish, but what I hear General Kadish saying is I think it is essentially, if everything worked well experimentally, it would be essentially a software change to turn it into an operational capability. It's a little more than just change of mental intent. There would have to be definitely command and control changes, probably some communications changes. But I think it's what you would call in the area of software

14 July 2001

General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
"Missile Defense Director Kadish Briefs After Successful Test"

• "This test is the same test we did the first time, that we tried the second time, and we tried the third time. So this is an idea that we want to replicate the difficulty so that we can get competence in the reliability of the hit to kill technology."
• "We've got a long road ahead...We do not know for certain that every objective was met. In all probability, some of them were not."

12 July 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, press conference at the Frontiers of Freedom Institute Conference

• "We don't have a system. We don't have an architecture. We don't have a proposed architecture. All we have is a couple of handfuls of very interesting research and development and testing programs .... And how fast these things will be able to be done is unclear, because the preliminary planning for them was not done."
• ". . .I think that having that defense would help with respect to proliferation. To the extent it was clear that we had the ability to defend against ballistic missiles, it dissuades other countries from believing that it's in their interest to invest in those missiles. Now, admittedly, they may then go to cruise missiles, they may then go to terrorism. One solution doesn't solve every problem. But the fact is, I think, that a ballistic missile defense would be helpful with respect to proliferation."

Q: The NSC put out a document last night that said the Bush administration has informed its allies and Russia that you expect research and development in missile defense will, quote, "conflict with ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years." Could you expand on that a little bit? Exactly when do you think that that -- you'll bump up against the treaty or conflict with it?

Rumsfeld: There's no way to know. It depends -- that's why they call it "research and development." You're looking for things you don't know the answers to, and you don't know how fast they're going to go or how successful they're going to be. You can't know.

Q:Yes, Wayne Davis with the -- (inaudible). Given that there could be also a conflict with the treaty within months and not years, and the fact that the United States does not want to be seen as violating the treaty, how does this administration prepare the specific proposals on how you would amend the treaty or how you would move beyond it, and when do you expect those discussions to begin with Russia?

Rumsfeld: Those are decisions for the president, and I think -- I'm not part of the National Security Council drafting of that words, whoever quoted it said "months" or something. You know, you can have lots of months -- 12 months, 18 months, 24 months, I don't know. I don't know the document you're referring to, but I can tell you this. The United States is not going to violate the treaty. If we get to the point where we need to go beyond the treaty and we haven't been able to negotiate something, obviously there's a provision you can withdraw in six months, and that's what you'd have to do. But, you know, the United States, everyone's hung up on tearing down some trees in Alaska as though we're going to violate the treaty. We're not -- period, full-stop.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony and question-and-answer session

• "In 1972, we knew of only five countries that had nuclear weapons programs; today we know of twelve."
• "Today, the number of countries pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing advanced conventional weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing ballistic missile technology is growing. The number of missiles on the face of the earth is growing."
• "We must achieve release from the constraints of the ABM Treaty."
• "As I stated earlier, the current planned testing program is not designed with the constraints of the ABM Treaty in mind; neither has it been designed for the purpose of exceeding those constraints. However, as the program develops and the various testing activities mature, one or more aspects will inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and limitations. Such an event is likely to occur in months rather than in years. It is not possible to know with certainty whether it will occur in the coming year. This uncertainty is in part the result of inevitable uncertainty of all research and development programs."
• "The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that -- defenses. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would threaten us or our friends with ballistic missile attack. Russia is not such a country. Americans do not lie awake at night worrying about a massive Russian first-strike the way they worried about a Soviet first-strike during the Cold War."
• "Will our defenses be 100% effective? Mr. Chairman, no defense is 100% effective."
• "Very importantly, Mr. Chairman, it will not undermine arms control or spark an arms race. If anything, I believe building effective defenses will reduce the value of ballistic missiles and remove incentives for their development and proliferation. Since they will have virtually no effect on Russia's capabilities, there is no incentive for Russia to spend scarce resources to try to overcome them. And China is already engaged in a rapid modernization of its missile capabilities and will continue this modernization whether or not we build defenses."

BMDO Director Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony and question-and-answer session

During the presentation of a a video segment on mid-course interception

• "Now, to be sure, we have major difficulties in making this type of technology work and work reliably and effective (sic). And that's what this test program is designed to do, especially in the mid- course. And we have had very many failures in this process. However, it's an engineering challenge at this time."

Senator Carl Levin: General Kadish, three weeks ago you told us there was nothing in your recommendations which, if implemented, would violate the ABM Treaty in 2002. Is that still true, in your judgment?

Kadish: No, it isn't, Senator.

Levin: What's changed since you testified before?

Kasish: We -- at the time we talked about this, I believe I said at the time that the program was not fully approved and that the compliance review process was ongoing and could change things a lot.

Levin: What's changed?

Kadish: And what's changed is that the definition of the program in getting into the compliance review -- which is a lengthy process, to some degree -- pointed out events that were potentially more near-term that the secretary described. So this process is ongoing, and it will yield the types of decisions that you're talking about.

11 July 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfled, Interview With Group of Reporters

• "We have no intention of breaking the treaty. Trust me."
• "If there were some instance that gave rise to a period of tension and the risk of a ballistic missile from a hostile power, it would be unreasonable to think that you might not try at least to use something that had reached the deployment stage, just as has been done repeatedly throughout the history of our country."
• "We have no intention of doing either one [abrogation or violation of the ABM treay] to be perfectly honest. We have every intention of working out an arrangement with the Russians and I think we will. The bottom line is the treaty is designed to not have ballistic missile defenses, and the president has decided he wants to have ballistic missile defenses, and we are proceeding on an R and D (research and development) effort to get us to point where we can have ballistic missile defenses."
• "My guess is that the outcome [of the missile test] will be, unfortunately, simplified when it's over as either succeeding or not succeeding. But of course in any advanced technology activity, it is seldom that simple. [In such tests] a variety of things work properly and a variety of things may not, and more information may be needed. And I suspect that that will very likely be the outcome in this instance."

10 July 2001

Pentagon Spokesman Rear Adm. Craig R. Quigley, DoD News Briefing

Q: Using the current ground-based system and the current kill vehicle and the current booster, there have been three tests so far; two have failed. If Saturday night's test fails, does that pretty much mark the end of the ground-based system as we now see it?

Quigley: I think you're describing the results in an overly simplistic manner, with all due respect. In each one of those tests we increased our body of knowledge an incredible amount. You would like to have a hit every time that you test the system. Realistically, that's not going to happen. But you learn from each test that you do and refine your program, your hardware, your software, the processes that you use to test the systems, and you are ever approaching a system that works more effectively all the time. So as Secretary Rumsfeld said the other day in testimony on the Hill, I suspect that Saturday night's test will achieve a wide range of good data points. Some will have been as good as we could hope for; others we would for something better. But we will learn in all cases and advance our knowledge. That's what testing is for.

Q: And just going back to the missile defense, what is the cost of the test that's happening on Saturday?

Quigley: About $100 million.

Q: Okay. So if the test on Saturday is $100 million, if now what you're proposing to do is test all sorts of different types of defense, you know, in combination, does that mean that the expense of the testing goes up exponentially by that?

Quigley: You have seen an increase in the amount of money that we have proposed in the '02 budget for missile defense. A lot of that is going to be for a more robust test program. Now, the integrated flight test that we're going to do Saturday night is a very, very detailed test. They will not all be that detailed nor that expensive in their conduct. But this is quite an involved one Saturday, involving a variety of goals and objectives for this single test. So this one is quite expensive, but they won't all be that way.

On the use of proposed test site(s) in Alaska

Q: And Secretary Rumsfeld has talked about the possibility of using developmental technology, as it shows promise during the early testing phase, to provide some sort of rudimentary missile defense. Is it possible that down the road such a site might be used as a rudimentary missile defense, if future testing proved that the technology was working?

Quigley: I think if the country needed it, you would certainly consider such an option as viable. Let me give you an example from the recent past. During the Gulf War, the JSTARS aircraft was still under development and testing. It had not reached its initial operational capability to be a part of the operating forces. And yet when the nation needed it, its capabilities during the Gulf War, it was pressed into service and did quite well. I think that the motivation in setting up the test bed as part of the '02 budget proposal is just that, Jamie. It is intended to be a test site. We intend to do a -- conduct a much more robust test program and to develop the research and data and analysis that you need to test out different means of providing missile defense. But if the need arose and that's what the nation needed, we would do anything and everything we could to provide a capability.

5 July 2001

Ambassador Robert Gray, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, addressing the Netherlands Atlanic Association

"Article 51 of the United Nations Charter speaks of the inherent right of self-defense. Let us be quite clear: The UN Charter does not accord the right of self-defense. To the contrary, the Charter recognizes the right of self-defense, saying that this right is inherent and that nothing in the Charter shall impair it. The conclusion ought to be obvious, but I shall state it anyway: The United States and its allies have an inherent right to adopt appropriate methods of missile defense."

29 June 2001

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, DoD News Briefing

Q: You were in Europe in May. Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush have also gone to Europe to try to convince the allies of the U.S.' need for a missile defense program.' What is the current state of play that concerns us after those three missions to Europe? Where does the European opinion stand from your standpoint? A lot of convincing left to do, or...

Wolfowitz: I think they're waiting for us and the Russians. So much depends on how the nature of our conversations evolve. And we're still thinking through the process of what is the best way ahead. Because the president's made it clear he's determined to move forward in missile defense, but he's also made it clear that he wants to do that if at all possible cooperatively with the Russians. That's what we've been using these various conversations and consultations to get a better feel for what might be a way to do that. I think most of our allies, while they may have views of their own, it's, to me it's pretty striking that their biggest single concern, overwhelming all others, is how will the Russians react. So until we pursue those conversations with the Russians further and come to some sense of how the Russians will react, it's pretty hard to know what our allies will finally have to say.

Q: What's the time line on some kind of discussions with the Russians to come to a new framework agreement?

Wolfowitz: It's a mistake to predict time lines.

28 June 2001

Secretary of Defense Rusfeld, House Armed Services Comittee testimony and question-and-answer-session

• "The ABM Treaty is not, and to my knowledge, never was the centerpiece or cornerstone of strategic stability."

21 June 2001

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee testimony and question-and-answer session

• "There are some important facts which are not debatable. The number of countries that are developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction is growing. The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the Earth and the number of countries possessing them is growing as well. In '72, we assessed a total of nine countries as having ballistic missiles. Today we know of 28 countries that have them. And we know that those are only the cases we know of."
• "The president, as you know, in his visit to Europe, in his meeting with President Putin indicated that the ABM Treaty in its present form restricts the kind of research and development that he believes is desirable and appropriate for this country if we are to avoid a situation where the Saddam Husseins or Kim Jong Ils of the world can hold our population senators -- centers hostage."
• "I don't yet understand what it means when I read that someone says that a treaty that is 20 years old -- 30 years old and prohibits missile defense is the centerpiece of an entire fabric of arrangements from the Cold War between two hostile states in the year 2001. It is not -- the Cold War is over. We're not hostile states. They are going to be reducing their nuclear weapons regardless of what we do. We're going to be reducing our nuclear weapons to some level, regardless of what they do. And it just seems to me that we've still got our heads wrapped around the Cold War language and rhetoric, and it's a mistake."
• "Deploying missile defense if it doesn't work. And I'm glad you asked it; it is a wonderful question. And you're quite right, I've been badly quoted on that. First of all, the reason I said that was that I was asked a question as to can you imagine a circumstance where you would deploy something that had not been fully tested -- not that it wouldn't work, but it had not been fully tested. And the answer was yes. The United States has been doing that for a long time."
• "Second, I have asked the question, Would you deploy something that doesn't work in a different sense, that it doesn't work all the time? And what good would that be? And I have said of course I would be delighted to deploy something. I mean, that's like saying if your car doesn't work all the time, you don't want a car, you want to walk. We don't have a weapons system that works all the time. I don't know of one. I don't think there is one. Indeed, the dumb weapons have a very small percentage of -- actually, the ones that you hook in, let go, and go for something, the total number of times they achieve that is a relatively small fraction. The smart ones are still not up at a hundred percent, likely not up in the 90s."
• "Now the mantra coming out of the administration is this. We don't know what the best approach to missile defense will be. We suspect that the treaty is restrictive on testing anything that's mobile -- at sea, in the air. Now if that's true -- and I believe it to be true -- and if we are convinced that we owe it to our country to proceed with testing some of those things at some pace where they're ready to be tested, then obviously we're going to have to get relief under the treaty."

13 June 2001

Senior Administration Official, press briefing (full briefing), Brussels, Belguim

Senior Administration Official: "In the first place, there was, on a new strategic framework and missile defense, all allies recognized that there is a real and growing threat, caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery."

Q: "That's exactly the language they refused to put into the communique -- "

Senior Administration Official: "I'm not trying to put language into the mouths. I'm trying to characterize. Everyone recognized that there was a threat. Everyone recognized that the debate is an important one, and it is important for the Alliance to deal with this. Now, some allies, some allies were strongly, vocally for missile defenses. One ally spoke of -- again, I don't want to quote, but to paraphrase, a sort of moral imperative to develop defenses because, as he put it, this is, after all, a defensive alliance, and it is better to rely on defenses to protect ourselves."

Q: "Who was that?"

Senior Administration Official: "I don't want to -- I believe the NATO rules are we don't give away individual allies."

Q: "Is that an exact quote, then?"

Senior Administration Official: "No, it is not an exact quote, but it is a very close paraphrase."

White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer, press briefing (full briefing), Air Force One

Q: "So is he going to give NATO leaders any greater level of detail on NMD than he has so far?"

Mr. Fleischer: "It's going to be a discussion of the reasons for missile defense, how it's in the interest of our allies, how as President Aznar was talking yesterday, how it's a system that he doesn't understand why people can't show their willingness to move forward with it. But if you're looking for specificity in terms of the missile defense system, of course not. The United States is not at that stage, yet. The United States is at the stage of talking broadly about the need for missile defense. And that's a message, frankly, that's been well received by many of the NATO allies -- not all, but many. And you're going to hear those voices today."

Q: "Is he going to talk at all to them about ways in which they can become involved, you know, a la the offer that was -- the trial balloon that was floated a couple of weeks ago to Russia, to buy us 300 missiles for European defense? Will he talk to these leaders about what might be in it for them?"

Mr. Fleischer: "I think the President's focus will be on the vision of a missile defense, how it's in our allied interest to have a system to protect against rogue launch of missiles and how it helps to preserve the peace. That will be the tenor of the President's remarks."

6 June 2001

Briefing by National Security Advisor Rice on President Bush's trip to Europe and Russia

Q: "What's the message the president's going to bring to the allies who are critical of the administration's positions on global warming and missile defense?"

MS. RICE: "Well, first of all, the administration will bring to the allies another statement of our very strong interest in a strong alliance and strong alliance relations. And as a part of that, we will understand that there will be times when we don't always agree on exactly what approaches to take to different problems ... On missile defense, I think that I would not characterize it as disagreement. I would say that we're in the midst of ongoing consultations with our allies about how to best move forward to address the common threats of today's security's environment. We understand that we are putting a lot on the table in talking about an entirely new security framework, a new comprehensive approach that includes a new offense/defense mix, that puts offensive nuclear reductions on the table, that talks about new efforts at nonproliferation. We understand that there is a lot to digest here. The consultations have just begun, and we look forward to talking with the Europeans. But the one thing the president will really underscore is that we have more in common than we have in disagreement, and that we really should be celebrating that which we have in common."

Q: "The whole question of the whole missile defense, it doesn't work yet, and yet you're going to unveil it as our defense?"

MS. RICE: "Well, Helen, first of all, I want to say very clearly that the president is talking about a new strategic framework for dealing with threats of today, not the threats of yesterday. It is not 1972."

Q: "Right, but he doesn't have a system that works yet."

MS. RICE: "It is not l972. What we are embarking on, and have told the allies that we wish to embark on, is a comprehensive research, development, testing and evaluation program of many promising ideas. Some will accelerate, some will drop by the wayside. But this needs to be seen not just in the context of what we do about missile defense, but what we do about addressing the threats that are really there today. This is not an era in which the Russians, pointing thousands of nuclear warheads at the United States on high stages of alert, with concerns about a Soviet conventional attack in Europe, is anything like the current situation. So the president is going to talk about the new security environment."

3 June 2001

NBC's "Meet the Press"

Tim Russert: "Missile Defense System. Tom Daschle, the new leader of the Senate, said it's not going to happen. Carl Levin, the new chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said it's not going to happen. You had a tour of Europe, and Europeans said to you they don't want it to happen. Is the Missile Defense System, as proposed by George W. Bush, dead?"

Secretary of State Powell: "Well, let the debate begin. It is going to happen. The President is committed to it. The President believes very strongly that such defenses are needed as part of improving the overall strategic stability formula. He wants to cut the number of offensive nuclear weapons. That's noble. But he also sees threats that are out there that we have to deal with -- not threats from the old Soviet Union, now Russia, and not threats from China, but threats from states that don't operate by the same sort of rational rules. He believes it would be irresponsible not to pursue those technologies that might defend us from such attacks. We are entered into a period of consultation and discussion with our European allies, our Asian allies, and especially with the Russians. These will be tough discussions. I hope we will make them more understanding of the threat that we see, and we hope we will be able to convince them that we have technologies that can deal with this. I hope I can make that same case, and Secretary Rumsfeld can make that same case, to our new committee chairmen in the Senate."

1 June 2001

National Security Advisor Condeleeza Rice

"[I was] the high priestess of arms control ... [when they] were a way that the world could avoid the apocalypse ... [I] eagerly anticipated those breathtaking moments of summitry where the centerpiece was always the signing of the latest arms control agreement ... arms control was a poor substitute for a real shared agenda based on common aspirations, but it was the best way any one could think of to manage the balance of terror. [Now] we must deal with today's threats, including weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the hands of states that would blackmail us and keep us from coming to the aid of our friends and allies ... those arms control ideas or treaties that respond to today's realities and build tomorrow's security we will advance and support."

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CNN Interview

• Ballistic missile defense "isn't a shield. These are very limited capabilities to deal with handfuls of things. The idea that it would in any way change the dynamic between the United States and Russia is just utterly wrong. I mean, they have thousands of weapons, not handfuls of these things -- thousands. They know that. They know that."

29 May 2001

Secretary of State Colin Powell, press conference at NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Budapest, Hungary

• "There is recognition that there is a threat out there. And it would be irresponsible for the United States as a nation with the capability to do something about such a threat, not to do something about such a threat.... If you want to have the systems that can deal with such threats, you don't wait until they are pointed at your heart. You start working on it now. And that is what we are doing."

Deputy State Department Spokesman Phil Reeker, press briefing

• The United States and Russia "have held discussions. They certainly weren't the last of the discussions, the many discussions we plan to have on this topic. In terms of potential cooperation, this could possibly include expanding in terms of shared early warning and other joint efforts, the possibility of purchasing components, systems or even whole systems from allies or friends, and potentially even the Russians. As you know, the Russians have invested heavily for years in advanced air defense and missile defense technologies, and some of those may be of significant value to us in our development and deployment of limited defenses against today's threats."

25 May 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfled, Interview with PBS NewsHour

Jim Lehrer: "What do you say to those Democrats and other critics who hammer you on this idea that you have said or suggested, "well, an imperfect missile defense system is better than no missile defense system," that, "okay, it may not work perfectly, but let's do one that kind of works?"

Secretary Rumsfeld: "Sure. Well, ... should we abolish automobiles because they don't work every single time we get in them? Of course not. The Wright brothers -- how many times did they fail before they finally flew? We wouldn't have airplanes if we said, "oh, my goodness, the Wright brothers' flight didn't fly; it crashed, therefore, let's not try again." There's never been an advanced research and development project that hasn't had some mishaps in its early period. Furthermore, there's practically no system I know of that works a hundred percent of the time; that is to say, that it does everything anyone could conceivably want all the time."

Secretary Rumsfeld: "Take a medicine. We spend billions of dollars developing new medicines, and, well, they work on some people, but not others, and they work 60 percent of the time for some people and not others. Now, is that bad? Does that mean you shouldn't have the medicine because it helps save lives 60 percent of the time? I think that if one looks at any complicated system, you'll find that it does not work perfectly 100 percent of the time. It may be .9; it may be .7 success; that's plenty."

24 May 2001

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfled, Interview with the New York Times

• "The president has said that missile defense is a priority. He recognizes the reality of proliferation. He also recognizes that those weapons need not even be fired to alter behavior. That is to say that to the extent they exist in people's hands, we don't wish you well. It begins to change the behavior of their neighbors. It begins to change the behavior of countries that might be aligned with us in a coalition. And that a policy of perpetuating the vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is really not a strategy. It is a course of action which would pretty much assure that the United States would be faced with a series of decisions with respect to deployed forces, with respect to the inability to assist allies and friends. It could lead to isolationism because of the concern about the power of those weapons and the total inability to do anything with respect to those weapons. It could lead to proliferation. That is to say an absence of an ability to defend at all against any numbers of those weapons could become an incentive for countries that have restrained from developing their own missiles and their own weapons of mass destruction."
• "I think one ought to want to deploy some capability with respect to missile defense as soon as you can do it in a way that's sensible, in a way that is cost effective, and in a way that does not decouple us as a country from our friends and allies and other forces."

16 May 2001

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, departure statement from Beijing, China

• "I stressed that our plans for a missile defense system would not be a threat to China. Rather, our approaches are intended to defend against threats or attacks from rogue states as well as from accidental or unauthorized launches. Although we clearly still have differences of opinion, our consultations on this subject were constructive and constitute a good beginning to what both sides agreed would be a continuing dialogue on these important security issues."

15 May 2001

Pentagon spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley, press briefing

• "[T]his is not the Cold War. This is not the time of the early 1970s when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, through the '80s when you had a very robust Soviet Union and you basically had the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the West.... That's not the world that faces us today. Despite the existence over all these years of America's very capable deterrent force, it has not been capable of deterring all conflict in the world during the time that it's been in existence. So if you say that the world of the '70s and the '80s is gone, then you need to think about what deterrence means in the first part of the 21st century in a different way. And that was really at the heart of the discussions with our friends and allies around the world."
• Regarding the Administration's dispatch of missile defense consultation teams to Europe: "...the reaction amongst the allies that were briefed was mixed. It was appreciative. They were almost uniformly appreciative of the consultations in the first place, being asked; not being presented a done deal, 'Here it is, take it or leave it.' It was kind of, 'Here's our thinking and we'd like to hear your thoughts as well.' So there was appreciation of that. But as I'm sure you're all aware, there was also an expression of skepticism from some of the capitals as well for a variety of reasons, concerns on -- of cost, technical feasibility, treaty issues, and a variety of things. "

14 May 2001

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, press conference

• ``The secretary has made clear, the president has made clear that we intend to proceed with defense, and defense is part of our ... strategic framework.''

Secretary of State Colin Powell, CNN interview

Ms. Koppel: You had a team of some of your folks and some of the Pentagon folks off in Moscow recently to talk about missile defense. Now, at least publicly, the Russian response has been somewhat cool to your desire to move forward with missile defense, warning against unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. Do you see that as theatrics, or do you --

Secretary Powell: It was not a surprising response. We went to consult with them, not just about missile defense but about the strategic framework that has guided the relationship between the two countries over these many, many years; to talk about strategic offensive weapons that we have and how to go to lower numbers, to talk about proliferation activities, counter-proliferation, non-proliferation activities; and, yes, to also talk about how missile defense can add stability to this strategic equation, all within the context of the ABM Treaty. And they heard our team, ably led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley. They heard our comments. Their reaction is not surprising, and Foreign Minister Ivanov and I will continue those discussions later this week. It's the beginning of a process of consultation, just as the President intended when he made his speech on the 1st of May.

Ms. Koppel: Does Moscow have right to be concerned that, if it doesn't agree to amend the ABM Treaty or just to scrap it, that the US would unilaterally withdraw?

Ms. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, I am sure you can appreciate the fact that other countries watching a great country like the United States talk about the possibility of breaking a treaty could lead them to say, well, what's good for the goose is good for the gander; we'll break a treaty.

Secretary Powell: Well, you haven't heard us say we're going to break a treaty. What you heard us say is that the world has changed since this particular treaty was signed some years ago; and our partner in that treaty is now Russia, and we should discuss with Russia whether or not the treaty is still as relevant as it was 30 years ago. And there are different points of view on that. But there is nothing peremptory about this. There is nothing unilateralist about this. There is nothing arrogant about it. I think a nation such as the United States, which has a leadership position in the world, should lead into the future and not be trapped by the past. Russia is also a great nation, which is a leader on the world stage, and I hope they'll be willing to engage with us to see what makes sense for the 21st century.

11 May 2001

Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, press conference, Ankara, Turkey

• "We are far from a specific architecture. We are far from specific cost. We are far from asking any allies to do anything specific. These are all things yet to come if this system proves itself, as we believe it will, to be an advantage for strategic stability in the future."

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, press conference

Q: "Your wandering minstrels of NMD seem to be getting some mixed messages in their travels, from somewhat vague support from India, to outright rejection in Moscow, and serious questions from the Germans. I'm just wondering what your initial reaction is to these things."

Mr. Boucher: "I don't think you accurately characterize at least what I have seen in the press and what I have seen others saying. The Russians said there was a good discussion, something about more questions and answers at this stage, but that's not surprising either. Remember, the President made clear from the start these were consultations, these were real consultations to talk to friends and allies about these important issues. We were going to share our strategic thinking, and we were going to share as well some of the thinking about the direction we intend to go with. But we are not at a stage of going out to announce decisions and ask for support."

10 May 2001

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, press conference in Rome

• "The world of 2001 is not the same world that it was in 1972, that Russia is not our enemy, that the whole structure of European security and defense can change, and that this change is something that we all ought to be working together to think about and to consider ... the challenge that comes to us all now (is) from missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

9 May 2001

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, press conference in Paris

• "We are certainly not trying to throw arms control aside ... It is not that we want to protect the United States and not protect anyone else. It is in our interest that Russia, for example, is not vulnerable to that type of limited attack as well."

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, press conference in Copenhagen

• "I think it's important that we move beyond this question of "N"MD. What we talked about today with the Minister and his colleagues was missile defense. And that is missile defense not only for the United States but available to all of those countries that would like to have it and participate in it if the technology works. What we have had today is a conversation with Allies. I don't mean to correct you here, but I think it's important that we are talking about missile defense."

Undersecretary Grossman, press conference, The Hague

• "Theme number one was the theme of consultations. We came here to convey the views of the United States, but also very importantly, as President Bush said on the 1st of May, to hear the views of allies, and very importantly, our allies in the Netherlands.
  
  The second theme that ran through all of the presentations that we made, is that the world of 2001 is not the world of 1972. The Cold War is over; Russia is no longer an enemy. There are huge plusses to this world. We are no longer confronting the same kinds of threats that we confronted in the Cold War. But there are minuses to this world as well. And one of the minuses is that of proliferation. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has really become a major new threat to the Alliance, and to our friends and to our allies."

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, press conference in Seoul

• "I also was able to discuss with President Kim and his colleagues, and will continue tomorrow to discuss, a new strategic framework, which in our view, has several elements: one, nonproliferation; second, counter-proliferation; the third, missile defense; and fourth, the view that the United States is willing unilaterally to reduce our nuclear arsenal down below the levels envisioned in START II. We would like others, and the Russian Federation, to come along with us, but we are willing to do it, unilaterally, down to the level where we can protect ourselves and our allies. Those discussions, as I say, will continue tomorrow. I did not come to present the Republic of Korea with a fait accompli. I did not come to present any final decisions on so-called missile defense. It was simply to get the views of our friends and allies on this matter so I can carry them back to the President."

8 May 2001

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Pentagon news conference "People think, you know, 'My goodness, they obviously have something in their heads that's all firm and all fixed, and they're going to suddenly pull open the curtain and there it is.' Not true . . . There is no question but that the ABM Treaty has prevented research and development and testing and experimentation with a host of things . . . and that is the subject of the consultations that are taking place."

6 May 2001

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, CBS Face the Nation

(Host Bob) Schieffer: "Mr. Secretary, let's turn to missile defenses ... How could you be for a program that you would deploy something before you know if it works or not?"

Rumsfeld: "Well, the first thing we should say is that I don't think anyone's indicated they plan to deploy something that doesn't work. And that's kind of a red herring to say, why would we deploy something that doesn't work? The second thing we should say is, anyone who expects that a research and development program is going to have a perfect test program and never have a failure doesn't understand what research and development and testing is. The Corona program, which was an overhead satellite program, had 11 or 12 or 13 failures before it had a success. And President Eisenhower continued with it, and it saved us billions and billions of dollars."

National Security Advisor Rice, ABC This Week

(Host Cokie) Roberts: "Now you talk about a different threat environment, but there are those that say the real threats are suitcase bombs, a boat coming up the Potomac ' that no missile defense will do any good against."

RICE: "Well, the president of the United States has to prepare the nation to respond to the entire range of threats. No one is saying that one should ignore terrorism or the suitcase bomb, or, for that matter, conventional attacks against American forces. But clearly, ballistic missile threats are different: They're very rapid in time; they cannot be defended at all. We, in fact, spend a good deal of money on terrorism. We have caught any number of terrorists at various borders trying to wreak havoc in the United States. So it's not a matter of either/or, it's a matter of really trying to defend against the full range of threats that would affect America, its allies and its forces abroad."

4 May 2001

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer,White House daily briefing

Q "Ari, missile defense recently, and Kyoto before that, has some U.S. allies worried that this is an 'our way or no way administration' with a unilateralist foreign policy. What do you say to that?"

MR. FLEISCHER: "That's precisely why the President made a series of phone calls to European leaders the day before he announced the missile defense speech. In addition, he spoke to the new Prime Minister of Japan the weekend before his speech. And it's a pledge that the President has made to our allies, that he will move in a fashion that is consultative, not unilateral. And I also offer you previous meetings the President had with a series of leaders -- Prime Minister Blair, Chancellor Schroeder -- where the President discussed, in a very constructive fashion, his thoughts about missile defense."

1 May 2001
President George W. Bush, Speech at the National Defense University

• "We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past."
• "We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be ensured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack. The threat was real and vivid."
• "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation. We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past."
• "This treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries."

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, press conference with Australian Defense Minister Peter Reith

• "(U.S. missile defenses) need not be 100 percent perfect, in my opinion."

30 April 2001

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer

• ``The message to Russia is that the development of a missile defense system - so we can think beyond the confines of the Cold War era - is the best way to preserve the peace.''
• "Because as the President said during the campaign, it's very important as he moves forward with this new thinking about how to protect the American people and our allies from missile threats, consultation is key. And the President reached out today to talk to allied leaders and to talk to American people tomorrow; as our teams will soon depart the United States to meet with their European counterparts, to engage in those consultations. The consultations are an important and promised part of what the President said he would do in the development of a missile defense system."

26 April 2001
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Hearings on the FY 2002 State Department budget

• "...the ABM Treaty was designed at a different time, a different age when there was a Cold War, where there was a Soviet Union, and it does not serve the same purpose today that it served back in 1972. But we want this to be a consultative process. We want to hear from them. We want to hear why they think it is still as relevant as it was in 1972. And we want to see if we can persuade them that that may not be the right answer."

29 March 2001
President Bush, Press Conference

• "On missile defense, for example, I've assured our allies that we will consult with them. But we're moving forward to develop systems that reflect the threats of today. I mean, who knows where the next terrorist attack is going to come from, but we'd better be ready for it. And I believe I've got the opportunity to convince our friends and allies that our vision makes sense. It brings a lot of common sense to an old, stale debate, the old arms control debate."

26 March 2001
Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Conference with French Foreign Minister Vedrine

• "Our policy is to deploy effective missile defenses that are capable of defending not only the United States, but also friends and allies and deployed forces overseas, and to do it based on the best available options at the earliest possible date."

19 March 2001

Joint statement by President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori

18 March 2001
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Sunday Telegraph

8 March 2001
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson

5 March 2001
Vice President Dick Cheney, Washington Times

• "We'd like to make it clear that the ABM Treaty should not stand in the way of doing an effective job of research and ultimate deployment of limited defenses, and that we're prepared to move as aggressively as we can to develop a ballistic missile defense."

28 February 2001

U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary-designate Paul Wolfowitz Bush's Plans for the Pentagon Include Base Closings and Money for Missile Defenses (New York Times) "I think one of the things that we need to do ' and hopefully the Russians will concur in this and we can do it cooperatively ' is to relax a number of the restrictions in the A.B.M. treaty that I believe prevented us from looking adequately at those kinds of options [to research missile defense]. "

27 February 2001
President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress

• "Our nation also needs a clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century -- threats that are more widespread and less certain. They range from terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass destruction. To protect our own people, our allies and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile defenses."

U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary-designate Paul Wolfowitz, Senate Confirmation Hearings

• "...we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorists and the complex set of threats to our information systems and our all-important assets in space. U. S. power in the field is unparalleled. Many of our enemies have determined that in order to move against us, they must be able to strike us at home. Some have chosen to develop long-range missile systems. Others have chosen to support or direct terrorist attacks with conventional devices, weapons of mass destruction, or cyber weapons against our nation, our forces, or our diplomats abroad. We must do everything in our power to stop them."
  
  
• "...we must fashion and sustain a new form of deterrence appropriate to the new strategic environment. The proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a key element in the new strategic environment. We need new concepts and forms of deterrence to deal with it. We need a deterrence based less on massive levels of punishment or retaliation, and more on the use of both defensive and offensive means to deny our adversaries the opportunity and benefits that come from the use of weapons of mass destruction."

23 February 2001
President George W. Bush, Joint Statement by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair

• "We recognize the existence of a common threat stemming from the growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and increasingly sophisticated missiles for their delivery. We are already working together in this area, and agree on the need for further substantive bilateral consultations, as well as close consultations with other allies. This consultation process, which will involve contacts with other interested parties, will include a review of our common strategic assumptions so that they reflect the contemporary security setting, and especially the growing threat from WMD-armed adversaries in regions of vital interest. We need to obstruct and deter these new threats with a strategy that encompasses both offensive and defensive systems, continues nuclear arms reductions where possible, and strengthens WMD and missile proliferation controls and counter-proliferation measures."

22 February 2001
President George W. Bush, News Conference

"I was pleased to see comments from Russian leadership that talked about missile defense. Their words indicate that they recognize that there are new threats in the post-Cold War era, threats that require theater-based, anti-ballistic missile systems. I felt those words were encouraging.... Mr. Putin also talked about theater-based systems and the ability to intercept missiles on launch. And to me, it's indicative of his recognition of the realities of the true threats in the post-Cold War era, threats from an accidental launch, or threats as a result of a leader in what they call a rogue nation trying to hold ourselves or our allies or Russia, for that matter, hostage."

14 February 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, NewsHour With Jim Lehrer

 

• "...There is no question in my mind but that we will be able to evolve a system that will be able to deal with ballistic missiles. We know that the proliferation of these technologies across the globe is pervasive. We know that the Gulf War persuaded people they ought not to contest western armies' navies and -- they are looking at weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic missiles, Cruise Missiles, terrorism and various and things where they can have an advantage, so-called asymmetrical advantage; and, therefore, it's appropriate that we develop the capability to deal with relatively small numbers of these things. We are not talking about a shield to deal with tens and hundreds of thousands of these things. And Russia's concern about it -- it seems is me -- is not really serious because they know for sure that they have thousand of these things and we are talking about dealing are hands full."
• "Obviously it's to their [the Russians'] advantage to express concern about it [a national missile defense system]. There is the ABM Treaty, which they would have to adjust. I think before it's over, they will accommodate themselves. Of course - let's be very honest about what Russia is doing. Russia is an active proliferator; they are part of the problem. They are selling and assisting countries like Iran and North Korea and India and other countries with these technologies which are threatening other people including the United States and Western Europe and countries in the Middle East. So why they would be actively proliferating and then complaining when the United States wants to defend itself against the, the fruit of those proliferation activities it seems is me is misplaced."
• "The President has indicated that he intends to deploy a missile defense system. We are internally now reviewing various options. He concluded -- and I think fairly -- that vulnerability for the American people is not an appropriate strategy."

13 February 2001
President George Bush, Speech at Norfalk Naval Air Station

• "We will consult early and candidly with our NATO allies. We will expect them to return the same. In diplomacy, in technology, in missile defense, in fighting wars and, above all, in preventing wars, we must work as one. Transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest, and our unity is essential for peace in the world. Nothing must ever divide us."

11 February 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, on Fox News Sunday

"Any president looking at his responsibilities as commander in chief would have to say that a policy that is designed to keep the American people totally vulnerable does not make much sense." "It seems to me missile defense ought to be deployed at that point where we have fashioned a program that makes the most sense for us and for our friends and allies. We're not in this alone. And second, that the technologies evolved in a way that we can be reasonably confident." "Terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, cyber warfare, information warfare ' these are all things that are cheaper than land wars and where the technologies are currently available. And the United States has to recognize those emerging threats and see that we're arranged so that we are not subject to nuclear or terrorist blackmail."

9 February 2001
Colin Powell, Secretary of State
State Department On-the-Record Briefing

• "While he [Defense Secretary Rumsfeld] is making that assessment (of the various missile defense technologies), it gives the rest of us the opportunity to discuss with our friends and allies and the Russians and the Chinese and others what we had in mind, and how it all fits into an overall strategic framework that involves offensive nuclear weapons, our nonproliferation efforts, and defensive systems, both of a Theatre Missile Defense nature and National Missile Defense nature."

5 February 2001
Colin Powell, Secretary of State, ABC News This Week Interview

• "And at some point we will bump up against the limits of the ABM Treaty. At that time, we will have to negotiate with the Russians what modifications might be appropriate, and we have to hold out the possibility that it may be necessary to leave that treaty if it is no longer serving our purposes, or if it is not something that we can accommodate our programs within. But it's not something that's going to happen tomorrow, and it's not something that's going to happen without full consultation with our friends and allies and full consultation with the Russians, and beyond that, full consultation with other nations that have an interest in this, in Asia, Japan, Korea and China."

3 February 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Conference on Security Policy, Munich

• "A system of defense need not be perfect; but the American people must not be left completely defenseless. It is not so much a technical question as a matter of the President's constitutional responsibility. Indeed, it is, in many respects, as Dr. Kissinger has said, a moral issue."
• "Let me be clear to our friends here in Europe -- we will consult with you. The United States has no interest in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies. Indeed, we share similar threats. The U.S. has every interest in seeing that our friends and allies, as well as deployed forces, are defended from attack and are not vulnerable to threat or blackmail."

27 January 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfled Mulls Options for Defense Systems (Washington Times), A2

• "The Russians know, they have to know, that the kinds of capabilities that are being discussed are not capabilities that threaten them in any way..."

26 January 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Full Steam Ahead for Missile Defense(CBS News Eye on Politics)

• "It [the ABM] ought not to inhibit a country, a president, an administration, a nation from fashioning offensive and defensive capabilities that will provide for our security."

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Defense Department Press Conference

• "It was a long time ago that that treaty [ABM] was fashioned. Technologies were notably different, the circumstances in the world were notably different. The Soviet Union, our partner in that treaty, doesn't exist anymore. The focus that we necessarily had during the Cold War was on attempting to have a stable situation, given two nations with overwhelming nuclear capabilities. And all of that has changed."

17 January 2001
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor-designate
Bush Will Listen To Allies' Concerns On Various Issues, Rice Says (Department of State Washington File)

• On NMD, she said, the President-elect "has set as one of the criteria for any national missile defense that it has to protect not just us but our allies. He does not want a decoupling. This will take diplomacy. I think it also probably takes understanding the entire complex of nuclear issues," including proliferation concerns. "So we're in a different world than we were when the American nuclear arsenal faced off against the Soviet threat of thousands of nuclear warheads. The threats are different, and we'll take some time with our allies and friends and, indeed, with other interested parties, including the Russians, to talk about this new world and to figure out how to address it in an intelligent way."

Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor-designate
Bush Aides Upbeat on Possible Missile Defense, Iraq (Reuters)

• Bush and his team have made clear they intend to press on with a national missile defense system, despite opposition from Russia, China and most of the rest of the world. Nevertheless, Hadley said there is a "real opportunity here'' to reach some kind of accord with Moscow on the issue. Recent public statements proved there is "real overlap'' on the issue, in part because both sides start from the proposition that the relationship between Russia and the United States has ''moved beyond the Cold War logic but our nuclear deterrent posture has not,'' he said. He urged a "dialogue at a strategic level that begins to rethink the strategic (nuclear) relationship between the United States and Russia.''
  
  "I think you will find a basis for a lower nuclear posture, a different nuclear posture, a concept which says for the threats we both face in the post-Cold War world a mix of offensive and defensive forces makes sense, is stabilizing and can enhance deterrence,'' Hadley, a lawyer, said. "If we can get that common framework, I think we can work out the issues of our force structure on the offensive and defensive side,'' he said. He acknowledged this would be hard because of allied, Russian and Chinese concerns. "This is a major initiative we're taking, it's very difficult to do, but I think we have an opportunity here and there is some indication of responsiveness on both sides.''

Colin Powell, Secretary of State-designate
Senate Confirmation Hearings

• "We must consider that when we deploy our troops, whether for peace operations or for potential conflict, they are increasingly vulnerable to more than just simply conventional weapons. Conventional weapons are the primary threat, but we also see weapons of mass destruction at the top end of missiles that are being developed by nations. And we have an obligation, an obligation to our troops, an obligation to ourselves, an obligation to our allies and friends to move forward with missile defense on two fronts: first, theater missile defense, an important requirement to defend our forces. And as you know, President-elect Bush has made it quite clear that he is committed to deploying an effective ballistic missile defense using the best technology available at the earliest date possible. And we will be developing a plan for the way ahead, including, as was noted, looking at the diplomatic ramifications of such a missile defense program."
  
  "And I believe it is important,...to look at missile defense not just standing alone. It is one part of our overall strategic defense and offensive posture. When you're talking about strategic deterrence, what you're talking about is getting into the mind of a particular opponent and making sure that opponent realizes that he will never be successful if he decides to move down into the direction of threatening us or our friends with missiles or weapons of mass destruction. And that deterrence, in his mind, comes from knowing that he would be committing suicide, that we have the offensive power to destroy him should he ever take such an action. I believe that that deterrence is enhanced if he also knows that if he was able to launch a missile at us, we have the capacity of intercepting that missile and knocking it down."
  
  "When you put those two elements together, I think defense is strengthened, not weakened. And then when you add to that our command-and-control systems that give us assurance at what's happening, and when you add on top of that our nonproliferation activities, I believe that deterrence is ultimately strengthened and not weakened."
  
  "While we design this complete strategic framework and decide these very important issues on missile defense, there will be time to consult with our allies and our friends, to explain to them what we have in mind, why we think it is for the benefit of mankind to move in this direction. We will let the Chinese and the Russians know that it is not directed at them, but at other nations that we have less confidence in and their ability to act in rational ways."
  
  "And it is in that context then that we believe that the ABM Treaty in its current form is probably no longer relevant to our new strategic framework, and we hope to persuade the Russians of the need to move beyond the ABM Treaty."
  
  
• "... I would say that at this point, we should continue to move ahead as aggressively as possible [with development of a national missile defense system]. We can always make a judgment later as to whether to deploy or slow the deployment. But I think at this point it would be very unwise to bet on the come that this threat will not be there in a few years. And so the president-elect is committed to moving forward, and I know that Secretary Rumsfeld is committed to get into the Pentagon as soon as he can and taking a look at the development programs and seeing how fast we can move forward."
  
  
• "...I'd say we should move forward as rapidly as possible with the technology, and...when a system [national missile defense system] is ready to be deployed, I am sure that a prudent president at that time will -- and I'm quite confident it will be President George W. Bush, will make a judgment at that time as to the nature of the threat. And if the threat is there and the threat is real, I am absolutely confident he will move forward with deployment."
  
  
• "We will try to persuade our Chinese interlocutors that this system is not intended, nor does it have the capacity -- they may not believe this initially, but we'll try to persuade them -- have the capacity to destroy their deterrence force, the deterrence they think that is needed."
  
  "I also am reasonably sure that they're going to modernize that force, make it more survivable, make it mobile, perhaps, make it harder to get, which puts more of a premium on defense against, you know, those kinds of systems as they become more mobile."
  
  "'I'm sure they will try to make their systems more mobile, and they will try to make them more survivable. They may even double the number of such systems. Some people have speculated, ' that they would increase by a factor of 10. I hope we'll be able to persuade them that that is not an appropriate response to anything that they're going to see us doing. I hope we can persuade them that it is not a threat to them or a threat to their interests or their ability to deter the missiles."
  
  
• " ' I do understand their [US Allies'] concerns [regarding a national missile defense system], but I have also been through several things like this over the years where people see something new come along and they are terrified. It's going to shake old patterns of behavior. It's going to be terrible. Everything's going to be blown apart. But if it's the right thing to do, you do it anyway."
  
  
• "It may be necessary, ultimately, to walk out of the ABM treaty and abrogate our responsibilities. I don't think we're there yet. I think we've got a long way to go and we have a lot of conversations to have with the Russians over this, but the point I was making is that the framework that that treaty was designed for was a framework that really isn't relevant now."
  
  "We are moving forward with the capacity to develop missile systems, missile defense systems, and the only way we can eventually move forward to that goal is to see the ABM Treaty modified or eliminated or changed in some rather fundamental way from the manner in which it has been implemented since it was signed in 1972. "

14 January 2001
President-elect George W. Bush
Excerpts From the Interview With President-Elect George W. Bush (New York Times)

• " ... and national missile defense is going to be an assignment of the secretary of state. I am very aware of that."
  
  
• Q. (New York Times)Would you go ahead even if it looked like the Chinese would build up their nuclear forces [to overwhelm the missile defense system]?
  A.They are building up their nuclear forces. . . .
  Q.But right now, they are nowhere near what Russia, for example, has deployed. . . .
  A.Correct. But nevertheless . . . Russia's nuclear force load is decreasing. They [China] are increasing. And we've just got to explain why we are doing what we are doing. National missile defense is ' let me start over. . . . The Chinese know and the Russians know that there will be no system developed in the immediate future or foreseeable future, is a better word, that can conceivably intercept a multiple launch regime. . . . You know that. They know that. . . . I'm kind of rambling on here.
  
  But I thought it was very interesting when at some point [Russian President Vladimir V.] Putin said, "You start talking about interception on the launch and theater-based protections." I found that to be an interesting statement. When I ever visit, I look forward to exploring that discussion with him, because it's precisely what I told [Russian Foreign Minister Igor S.] Ivanov in my meeting with him prior to the election. And they've raised great objections about missile defense, but I explained to them that I understand that the technology and the will, for that matter, of some in Congress will really mean that initially we will be deploying systems that will prevent the accidental launch of the ones and twos, with the ability for some nation like Iran to eventually say to us, "And we've got one aimed at Israel. And what are you going to do about
  it? . . . "

11 January 2001
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense-designate
Senate Confirmation Hearings

• "Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. It must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and the benefits that come from the threat or the use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces, our homeland, as well as those of our allies."
  
  
• "There is no question...that I think that we should deploy a missile defense system-- when it's technologically possible and effective..."
  
  
• "I think we need missile defense because I think it devalues people having that capability [ballistic missiles], and it enables us to do a much better job with respect to our allies."
  
  
• "If I know anything, I know that history shows that weakness is provocative. Weakness invites people into doing things they wouldn't otherwise think of."
  
  
• "The vulnerability of space assets has to be worrisome to people, as well as shorter-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, in addition to...long-range ballistic missiles."
  
  
• "...What are the risks of not deploying missile defense?...One is, it seems to me, if some countries that have significant technological capabilities decide that they are vulnerable to ballistic missiles from their neighbors and that we lack the ability to assist them in defending against that capability, that we may contribute to proliferation by encouraging them to go forward and develop their own nuclear weapons and their own ballistic missiles."
  
  
• "...I have a feeling that once the Russians understand that the United States is serious about this [missile defense] and intends to deploy, that they will -- as opposed to the reverse of that -- that they will in fact find a way in the negotiations -- I don't know quite how or when or in what way -- in the discussions that take place, to accept that reality, recognize that there are threats from states with capabilities that not only threaten us and our allies and our friends, but over time will threaten the Russians as well."
  
  
• "...the current [land-based missile defense] program may very well have been something that could be done sooner than some of the other alternatives, such as sea-based or space-based capabilities. On the other hand, my further impression is that the current system was designed to fit within the treaty [ABM]. And I've never believed...that treaty is ancient history."
  
  

---

• Proliferation News and Resources

National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet

Restructuring our defense and deterrence capabilities to correspond to emerging threats remains one of the Administration's highest priorities, and the deployment of missile defenses is an essential component of this broader effort.

Changed Security Environment

As the events of September 11 demonstrated, the security environment is more complex and less predictable than in the past. We face growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of states or non-state actors, threats that range from terrorism to ballistic missiles intended to intimidate and coerce us by holding the U.S. and our friends and allies hostage to WMD attack.

Hostile states, including those that sponsor terrorism, are investing large resources to develop and acquire ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication that could be used against the United States and our friends and allies. These same states have chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons programs. In fact, one of the factors that make long-range ballistic missiles attractive as a delivery vehicle for weapons of mass destruction is that the United States and our allies lack effective defenses against this threat.

The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the Soviet Union, their leaderships often are more risk prone. These are leaders that also see WMD as weapons of choice, not of last resort. Weapons of mass destruction are their most lethal means to compensate for our conventional strength and to allow them to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation.

Deterring these threats will be difficult. There are no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states. Our new adversaries seek to keep us out of their region, leaving them free to support terrorism and to pursue aggression against their neighbors. By their own calculations, these leaders may believe they can do this by holding a few of our cities hostage. Our adversaries seek enough destructive capability to blackmail us from coming to the assistance of our friends who would then become the victims of aggression.

Some states are aggressively pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as a means of coercing the United States and our allies. To deter such threats, we must devalue missiles as tools of extortion and aggression, undermining the confidence of our adversaries that threatening a missile attack would succeed in blackmailing us. In this way, although missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive response capability, they are an added and critical dimension of contemporary deterrence. Missile defenses will also help to assure allies and friends, and to dissuade countries from pursuing ballistic missiles in the first instance by undermining their military utility.

National Missile Defense Act of 1999

On July 22, 1999, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38) was signed into law. This law states, "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense." The Administration's program on missile defense is fully consistent with this policy.

Missile Defense Program

At the outset of this Administration, the President directed his Administration to examine the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. Our policy is to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available.

The Administration has also eliminated the artificial distinction between "national" and "theater" missile defenses.

The defenses we will develop and deploy must be capable of not only defending the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies; The distinction between theater and national defenses was largely a product of the ABM Treaty and is outmoded. For example, some of the systems we are pursuing, such as boost-phase defenses, are inherently capable of intercepting missiles of all ranges, blurring the distinction between theater and national defenses; and The terms "theater" and "national" are interchangeable depending on the circumstances, and thus are not a meaningful means of categorizing missile defenses. For example, some of the systems being pursued by the United States to protect deployed forces are capable of defending the entire national territory of some friends and allies, thereby meeting the definition of a "national" missile defense system.

Building on previous missile defense work, over the past year and a half, the Defense Department has pursued a robust research, development, testing, and evaluation program designed to develop layered defenses capable of intercepting missiles of varying ranges in all phases of flight. The testing regimen employed has become increasingly stressing, and the results of recent tests have been impressive.

Fielding Missile Defenses

In light of the changed security environment and progress made to date in our development efforts, the United States plans to begin deployment of a set of missile defense capabilities in 2004. These capabilities will serve as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded missile defense capabilities later.

We are pursuing an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments. The composition of missile defenses, to include the number and location of systems deployed, will change over time.

In August 2002, the Administration proposed an evolutionary way ahead for the deployment of missile defenses. The capabilities planned for operational use in 2004 and 2005 will include ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space. In addition, the United States will work with allies to upgrade key early-warning radars as part of our capabilities.

Under our approach, these capabilities may be improved through additional measures such as:

Deployment of additional ground- and sea-based interceptors, and Patriot (PAC-3) units; Initial deployment of the THAAD and Airborne Laser systems; Development of a family of boost-phase and midcourse hit-to-kill interceptors based on sea-, air-, and ground-based platforms; Enhanced sensor capabilities; and Development and testing of space-based defenses.

The Defense Department will begin to implement this approach and will move forward with plans to deploy a set of initial missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004.

Cooperation with Friends and Allies

Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against these threats. Missile defense cooperation will be a feature of U.S. relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means to build new relationships with new friends like Russia. Consistent with these goals:

The U.S. will develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies; We will also structure the missile defense program in a manner that encourages industrial participation by friends and allies, consistent with overall U.S. national security; and We will also promote international missile defense cooperation, including within bilateral and alliance structures such as NATO.

As part of our efforts to deepen missile defense cooperation with friends and allies, the United States will seek to eliminate impediments to such cooperation. We will review existing policies and practices governing technology sharing and cooperation on missile defense, including U.S. export control regulations and statutes, with this aim in mind.

The goal of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is to help reduce the global missile threat by curbing the flow of missiles and related technology to proliferators. The MTCR and missile defenses play complementary roles in countering the global missile threat. The United States intends to implement the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defense cooperation with friends and allies.

Conclusion

The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require us to think differently, but they also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses is an essential element of the United States' broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face. Defending the American people against these new threats is the Administration's highest priority.

# # #